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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no necessary connection between academics’ theories of 
the firm and judicial theories of the firm. Economists and legal scholars 
may adopt one theory of the firm, and courts may adopt another. We 
might even predict this result. Judges are not economists, and as increas-
ingly sophisticated theories of the firm emerge in the academic literature, 
judges are not well-positioned to keep pace with the evolving accounts. 
Indeed, judges may reasonably choose to adopt no theory at all. 
Given these premises, this Essay explores the relationship between 
academically developed theories of the firm and corporate legal doctrine. 
Legal scholars who focus on theories of the firm often develop an inter-
pretation of corporate law that endorses a particular legal theory of the 
firm. On these accounts, courts are thought to have adopted a commenta-
tor’s preferred theory (consciously or otherwise), with legal doctrine seen 
as a means of facilitating the formation and governance of firms with the 
desired features. There is another interpretation of corporate law worth 
considering, however. 
This Essay hypothesizes that much of corporate legal doctrine can 
be explained differently—not as the legal adoption of a particular theory 
of the firm, but rather as a response to judicial uncertainty regarding the 
correct theory of the firm. Theories of the firm still matter on this ac-
count—they motivate judicial reasoning—but they are not specifically 
adopted by corporate law. 
There is also evidence in support of this hypothesis. Courts, in fact, 
seem to go out of their way to avoid adopting a particular theory of the 
firm. At the same time, actual case outcomes are subject to multiple in-
terpretations from a theory of the firm perspective. Moreover, leading 
explanatory theories often must identify at least some cases as exceptions 
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to the rule, a necessity that indicates these theories do not perfectly fit the 
case law. These circumstances suggest the courts’ expressions of indeci-
sion on theories of the firm may reflect an underlying reality.1 
Notably, there are now a variety of theories of the firm relevant to 
corporate law. It is increasingly hard for legal institutions to adjudicate 
between these theories. This concern is compounded by the possibility 
that particular theories of the firm will fit best at different stages of a 
firm’s life span. Given that Delaware courts generally adopt one corpo-
rate law for various different types of corporations (from closely held to 
public),2 it is a challenge to determine how best to set the legal default. 
Even if courts could ascertain the best legal conception of the firm for 
purposes of public firms, this would not necessarily be the best legal 
conception of the firm for a corporate law that will regulate both public 
and private firms. 
Corporate law, however, may take into account the variety of theo-
ries of the firm by choosing not to adopt any particular theory. In other 
words, judicial uncertainty may be a factor driving much of corporate 
law.3 Courts may, quite understandably, wish to avoid standing in the 
way of whichever theory is best, while not knowing which theory that 
will be. We may then explain important features of corporate law in 
terms of their indeterminacy on theories of the firm. 
Given these possibilities, the discussion below will suggest a read-
ing of corporate law that does not take sides on theory of the firm de-
bates. In order to keep the analysis concise, this discussion will focus on 
fiduciary duties and doctrines related to their enforcement. Part II of this 
Essay will suggest an indeterminacy of corporate law with respect to 
theories of the firm, in light of express judicial statements on the topic. 
Part III will assess the significance of the business judgment rule. Part IV 
will assess the legal ambiguity concerning the identity of directors’ fidu-
ciary beneficiaries. Part V will assess corporate purpose clauses. Part VI 
then concludes. 
                                                            
 1. As will become clear, it is not just ultimate legal outcomes but also the legal reasoning 
courts use that support the interpretation suggested in this Essay. Cf. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Prag-
matic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 476–77 (2000) (explaining the importance of under-
standing legal practices in terms of the concepts embedded in legal reasoning). 
 2. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–81 (Del. 1993) (rejecting special rules for 
closely held corporations when not qualified as a statutory close corporation). 
 3. Obviously, this hypothesis would not provide a complete account of corporate law. Courts 
resolve various questions when they decide corporate cases, and there are substantive theories which 
drive these decisions. The point for purposes of this Essay is that with respect to particular theories 
of the firm, courts may intentionally leave legal doctrine agnostic. 
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II. EXPRESS STATEMENTS SUGGESTING LEGAL INDETERMINACY 
This Essay introduces a hypothesis that much of corporate law can 
be explained in terms of a choice not to adopt a particular theory of the 
firm, rather than an application of a particular theory of the firm. Because 
this proposed explanation requires us to interpret corporate law, a brief 
note on methodology may be helpful at the outset. 
A. Explanatory Methodology 
Interpretive legal theories do not always state their criteria for a 
successful interpretation. When they do so, such theories often empha-
size the fit between a legal theory and legal doctrine, and they often em-
phasize the normative justification for having a legal doctrine that 
matches the preferred interpretation.4 Other criteria, however, may also 
matter. For example, some theorists are concerned with predictive suc-
cess,5 and some are concerned with the transparency of judicial reasoning 
(that is, they are concerned with adopting explanations that assume 
courts mean what they say).6 Coherence is also an important aim.7 
That said, fit and justification are especially salient, particularly 
among scholars concerned with theories of the firm. Commonly, legal 
scholars’ accounts of corporate law combine a normative analysis that 
explains why a particular theory of the firm is desirable for corporate law 
to adopt with a positive account that explains how this theory of the firm 
is largely consistent with existing corporate law precedents.8 While the 
criteria for a successful interpretation are often left unsaid, descriptive fit 
and normative justification appear to dominate these explanatory ac-
counts. 
                                                            
 4. For a helpful account of several leading criteria for a successful legal interpretation, see 
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 7–32 (2004). 
 5. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 600 (2003) (“Because an economic model’s ability to predict real 
world outcomes is more important than the extent to which the model’s assumptions accurately 
depict the real world, the key question is whether the mediating hierarchy model facilitates accurate 
predictions about the content of the law.”). 
 6. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 24–32 (discussing a transparency criterion). This is not an ex-
haustive list, however. One might also look to such criteria as simplicity and consilience, or as noted 
below, coherence. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1873, 1884 (2011) (discussing the consilience criterion as it relates to interpretations 
of private law); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 38–41(2001) (discussing 
the role of consilience for legal explanatory accounts). 
 7. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 11–13 (discussing a coherence criterion). 
 8. Good examples include Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 559–92, and Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81 (1999). In both 
cases, proponents of the respective theories of the firm present a case for the efficiency of their con-
ception of the firm, as well as a case for the descriptive fit with existing corporate law. 
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The difficulty for present purposes is that each of the leading theo-
ries has a plausible claim to meet a reasonable fit criterion, and the out-
come under the justification criterion is a matter of dispute. Proponents 
of each leading theory can point to cases that seem to recognize their 
chosen theory of the firm. In addition, proponents of each leading theory 
can argue that the true basis for the desirability of the firm is the benefit 
that they discern. 
With respect to the fit criterion, it is hard to find clear winners 
among the contending factions. Once we include the law as it relates to 
both public and private corporations, the law as it relates to takeovers, 
and the law as it relates to corporate philanthropy, we find that most the-
ories have their strong and weak spots. We might conclude that certain 
explanatory failures should be fatal to an interpretation. But as a general 
matter, it is a difficult problem for an interpretive legal theory to explain 
precisely how stringent the fit criterion should be.9 Absent a compelling 
account for treating some cases as peripheral and other cases as core, it is 
difficult to differentiate among the leading theories purely on the basis of 
doctrinal fit. 
With respect to normative criteria, efficiency goals are largely 
shared by the leading explanatory accounts. Determining which account 
best squares with an efficiency aim is substantially more challenging. 
The empirical question whether a particular theory of the firm best com-
ports with efficiency goals is hard to assess. More to the point, it presents 
an empirical problem that courts are poorly suited to resolve. Courts are 
often considered to have weaknesses when it comes to determining the 
best means to an end for individual firms. But these weaknesses are not 
limited to ordinary business decisions. If we think courts cannot readily 
determine the best business choices for individual firms, why should we 
think they can readily determine the best theory of the firm? 
These concerns can help motivate a different type of explanatory 
theory. Suppose we try to interpret corporate law as a legal domain de-
signed with theories of the firm in mind but without any particular theory 
of the firm. Would this interpretation fit the legal doctrine? Would it also 
be justifiable to have a legal doctrine with such features? The sections 
below will suggest, at least in part, what such an interpretation might 
look like.10 
                                                            
 9. See William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort 
Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605, 637–43 (2007) (discussing concerns related to the fit criterion for theories 
of tort law). 
 10. While judicial uncertainty will play a significant role in developing the argument in this 
Essay, it should be noted that uncertainty can also have other explanatory roles in the corporate law 
setting. See, e.g., Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corpora-
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B. Evidence of Indeterminacy in Legal Reasoning 
As a starting point, one place we might look to see whether courts 
have affirmatively adopted a theory of the firm is the express language of 
judicial opinions.11 There is no question that theories of the firm have 
influenced judicial decision-making. Particularly in Delaware, the bench 
is staffed with judges who read and respond to developments in econom-
ic and legal scholarship. But as we will see, the evidence that they have 
adopted a particular theory is equivocal. 
It is uncommon for Delaware courts to affirmatively mention the 
“theory of the firm.” (A Westlaw search for this phrase in Delaware cas-
es turns up few examples.) Courts clearly respond to the theory of the 
firm literature, however. Indeed, Chancellor Allen specifically discusses 
theories of the firm in the reasoning of a judicial opinion. What is strik-
ing, to the extent express discussions exist, is the judicial ambivalence 
that these cases suggest. 
For example, in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., Chancellor Allen 
notes that “the prospect of losing a validly conducted shareholder vote 
cannot, in my opinion, constitute a legitimate threat to a corporate inter-
est, at least if one accepts the traditional model of the nature of the cor-
poration that sees shareholders as ‘owners.’”12 The sources Chancellor 
Allen cites in support of this traditional model are articles concerning the 
theory of the firm.13 On the other hand, in a footnote, the court then adds: 
“If the law accepts some other model of the corporation, shareholder ac-
tion through the vote might well be seen as constituting a threat to other 
corporate constituencies or to a distinctive corporate ‘entity.’”14 
Cases like Stahl are interesting examples because they suggest ei-
ther an uncertainty on the court’s part as to whether the law accepts a 
particular theory of the firm, or else a reluctance to make a definitive 
                                                                                                                                     
tion, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 767 (2006) (noting the importance of uncertainty for Frank Knight’s ap-
proach to the firm). 
 11. Although the transparency of judicial opinions is not always assumed in efficiency-based 
explanatory theories, this Essay will assume that, all else equal, a theory that treats judicial opinions 
as transparent has an advantage over one that does not. This Essay will thus assume as a starting 
point that judicial opinions accurately state the basis for courts’ decisions. For further discussion of a 
transparency criterion, see SMITH, supra note 4, at 24–32 (discussing a transparency criterion for 
explanatory theories of law). Cf. Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L .REV. 287 
(2007) (discussing and critiquing a transparency criterion for explanatory theories of law). 
 12. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 13. See id. at 1124 n.9 (citing William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: 
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); John C. Coates IV, Note, State 
Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of An Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806 
(1989)). 
 14. Id. 
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statement as to what that particular theory of the firm might be. While 
Chancellor Allen may well have had a theory of the firm in mind when 
deciding Stahl, he was careful not to ascribe any particular theory of the 
firm to “the law.” This type of judicial analysis supports the view that 
courts are intentionally leaving theory of the firm questions undecided.15 
There are also cases that implicitly do adopt a theory of the firm, 
even if they do not explicitly use the phrase. For example, in Unisuper 
Ltd. v. News Corp., Chancellor Chandler addressed a case involving an 
alleged corporate promise to put an extension of a poison pill to a share-
holder vote.16 The court’s analysis in resolving a motion to dismiss was 
premised in part on the view that shareholders are owners of the firm. As 
the court reasoned: 
Delaware’s corporation law vests managerial power in the board of 
directors because it is not feasible for shareholders, the owners of 
the corporation, to exercise day-to-day power over the company’s 
business and affairs. Nonetheless, when shareholders exercise their 
right to vote in order to assert control over the business and affairs 
of the corporation the board must give way. This is because the 
board’s power—which is that of an agent’s with regard to its prin-
cipal—derives from the shareholders, who are the ultimate holders 
of power under Delaware law.17 
This statement seems to endorse a particular theory of the firm (or a par-
ticular category of theory). Shareholders are owners on this account, and 
directors are their agents. 
But in a subsequent Unisuper opinion concerning leave to appeal, 
Chancellor Chandler took a step back from this unequivocal statement 
about shareholder owners and director agents.18 Now, the court charac-
terized its earlier opinion as one that “employed agency law principles to 
illustrate by analogy the gap filling nature of fiduciary duties.”19 This 
more recent language is much more open to interpretation. What was a 
relation of owners to agents turns into something more abstract and inde-
terminate in nature. 
                                                            
 15. It is also telling that Chancellor Allen apparently felt that the theory of the firm question 
was an open one—if the Delaware courts had clearly adopted a theory of the firm when Stahl was 
written, the court’s choice in Stahl not to endorse a theory would make substantially less sense. 
 16. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 
2005). 
 17. Id. at *6 (emphasis added). For recent discussion of the significance of the Unisuper case, 
see D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 
181–82 (2011). 
 18. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. Civ. A. 1699-N, 2006 WL 207505, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 19, 2006). 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Plainly, isolated opinions will not adequately prove the thesis of 
this Essay. There are some opinions that best fit with a particular theory 
of the firm, and clear judicial language on legal conceptions of the firm is 
not unheard of.20 Yet, there is also a broad range of cases that can be suc-
cessfully embraced by more than one theory. In addition, if we focus on 
explicit judicial language, the courts seem careful to avoid endorsing one 
particular theory of the firm. It is at least possible, from what we have 
seen so far, to think that corporate law lacks a particular theory of the 
firm.21 
Express language is not the only basis on which to interpret corpo-
rate law, however. As we will see, other aspects of corporate law are also 
consistent with the view that courts are reluctant to adopt a particular 
theory of the firm. For example, the business judgment rule can be un-
derstood in this way. To the extent courts are unsure what conception of 
corporations is most efficient—or what conception should ground their 
analysis—they can often abstain from deciding the question. In fact, this 
may be one of the key benefits provided by the business judgment rule, 
at least from a perspective of judicial uncertainty. The business judgment 
rule allows for a corporate law that does not adopt a theory of the firm. If 
the risk of judicial error is high enough, this is a significant gain. The 
business judgment rule has many reasons for its existence, but one of its 
basic justifications may be that it allows courts to remain detached from 
deciding between high-level theories. 
III. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS A MEANS TO INDETERMINACY 
One basic way courts can avoid reaching a complete resolution of 
theory of the firm debates is by rigorously enforcing the business judg-
ment rule. A standard description of the rule is that it is “a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on 
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company.”22 In practice, the rule 
means that a large number of fiduciary duty-based claims are subject to 
dismissal. 
                                                            
 20. For a recent example that appears to take a more shareholder-centric position, see eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 21. One might also look to the statements of Delaware and former Delaware judges in their 
non-judicial capacity, which indicate at least some indeterminacy in the legal point of view. See, 
e.g., William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual 
Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002) (describing the ambivalence of Delaware corporate 
law as to whether its sole aim is to facilitate shareholder economic welfare). Such commentary will 
presumably tell us less than published judicial opinions, but it may still provide indirect evidence in 
support of the reading proposed in this Essay. 
 22. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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Justifications for the rule are abundant, and it is safe to say that its 
existence is overdetermined.23 Among other reasons, it has been ex-
plained based on concerns with hindsight bias,24 lack of judicial expertise 
on business-related questions,25 the availability of shareholder diversifi-
cation,26 the potential consequences of director risk aversion,27 and the 
statutory allocation of authority within the corporation.28 In prior work, I 
have suggested that the business judgment rule is also a reasonable re-
sponse to severe problems of judicial uncertainty.29 
This latter concern is relevant here, for conditions of uncertainty 
will often produce divergent opinions on the subject that engenders such 
uncertainty. Here, the difficult question is which theory of the firm to 
adopt. And this uncertainty creates a potential problem. For while courts 
and commentators may differ on theories of the firm, courts must still 
reach decisions in concrete cases. The business judgment rule offers a 
pragmatic solution to this problem. 
Notice that courts do not need a fully developed theory of the firm 
in order to adopt the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule 
has all the earmarks of an “incompletely theorized agreement.”30 It is a 
legal doctrine that courts can adopt based on their consensus about desir-
able outcomes, without developing a shared viewpoint on the high-level 
theory that supports the low-level principles at stake.31 Such agreements 
are common in various areas of the law, and corporate law provides a 
likely example in this instance. 
                                                            
 23. The literature on this topic is immense. For examples of recent scholarship explaining the 
rule, see Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections 
on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 402 n.21 (2007) (listing 
articles). 
 24. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571, 621 (1998). 
 25. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (refusing to intervene in a 
decision to expand a business, and noting that “judges are not business experts”). 
 26. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing availability and significance 
of shareholder diversification). 
 27. See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with 
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Prob-
lem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 455 (2002). 
 28. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“Under Delaware law, the 
business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs 
of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”). 
 29. See Gold, supra note 23, at 447–72. 
 30. On incompletely theorized agreements generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theo-
rized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735–36 (1995) (“Participants in legal controversies try 
to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes. They agree on the result and 
on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it. They need not agree on fundamental principle.” 
(emphasis and footnote omitted)). 
 31. See id. 
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Suppose, hypothetically, that one member of the Delaware Supreme 
Court sees corporations in terms of a director primacy theory of the firm. 
Suppose another justice sees corporations in terms of a team production 
theory. Suppose that a third is undecided on a theory of the firm but feels 
strongly that business judgment rule protections should prevail for stare 
decisis reasons. All three of these justices can agree in their opinions that 
the appropriate legal doctrine is a protective business judgment rule, 
without ever having to work out their disagreements concerning a theory 
of the firm. 
For example, director primacy theories of the firm support the busi-
ness judgment rule because of its effect on the board’s internal functions, 
among other reasons.32 Team production theories of the firm support the 
business judgment rule in light of the need for a neutral mediating hier-
arch.33 The two sides may never agree on the ultimate foundations for the 
business judgment rule, but in practical terms, they rarely (if ever) need 
to. As an incompletely theorized agreement, the business judgment rule 
can function as a means to reach outcomes that are viewed as desirable 
by the relevant decision-makers, even if the bases for their views diverge 
significantly. 
But note also that an incompletely theorized agreement is a mecha-
nism to address uncertainty, even if judicial opinions do not diverge. The 
business judgment rule is often viewed as a response to judicial uncer-
tainty regarding the appropriate means to corporate ends. Courts have 
limited expertise at making business judgments, as is often emphasized. 
The business judgment rule, however, can also be viewed as a response 
to judicial uncertainty as to the appropriate ends of director decisions.34 
Most judges may resemble the third justice in our example above: they 
may simply not know what the best theory of the firm is, and according-
ly, precisely what ends directors should serve.35 
As non-economists, this judicial sense of uncertainty may also be 
prudent. The issues at stake are likely to raise “trans-scientific” prob-
                                                            
 32. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 125 (2004) (“[J]udicial review could interfere with—or even destroy—the inter-
nal team governance structures that regulate board behavior.”). 
 33. See Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 300 (“In particular, the rule may help prevent coalition 
members (and especially shareholders) from using lawsuits as strategic devices to extract rents from 
the coalition.”). 
 34. See Gold, supra note 23, at 436 (discussing directors’ interpretive discretion concerning the 
ends of fiduciary conduct). 
 35. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1735 (“Judges are certainly not ordinary citizens. But nei-
ther are they philosophers. Indeed, participants in law may be unwilling to commit themselves to 
large-scale theories of any kind, and they will likely disagree with one another if they seek to agree 
on such theories.”). 
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lems36—problems that cannot be cost-effectively resolved within a rea-
sonable time frame. The empirical complexities involved in determining 
outcomes based on different legal conceptions of the firm include: varia-
tions among different types of corporation, different moments in our 
economic history, stages of a firm’s existence, vagueness in corporate 
law, unobserved social norms, and an absence of jurisdictions compara-
ble to Delaware, among other things.37 
Not only are the empirical problems potentially irresolvable, but if 
they can be resolved, their resolution could also take a substantial num-
ber of years. Courts, which must decide cases in the short-term, are not 
capable of waiting ten or twenty years for a (perhaps) reliable set of em-
pirical data to emerge. Whether or not answers in the empirical literature 
will be forthcoming, courts are not in a position to wait.38 In short, there 
are good reasons to interpret the business judgment rule as a means to 
avoid adopting a theory of the firm. The business judgment rule ably fills 
this role, and we can see why courts would want it to. 
Courts nevertheless discuss fiduciary duties in terms that could po-
tentially implicate theories of the firm. Courts often analyze fiduciary 
duties as standards of conduct, and this feature of corporate jurispru-
dence raises distinct issues.39 The next Part will discuss the significance 
of legal doctrine on fiduciary standards of conduct. As will become ap-
parent, the legal doctrine here also points toward indeterminacy. 
IV. THE INDETERMINACY OF FIDUCIARY BENEFICIARIES 
Notwithstanding the above analysis, we might question the view 
that the business judgment rule is serving as a means for courts to avoid 
adopting a theory of the firm. Courts might still have such a theory, even 
if the business judgment rule permits otherwise. Legal doctrine could 
embody a particular theory of the firm, even if in the ordinary case, 
courts are able to remain detached. Yet, when we turn to what the courts 
                                                            
 36. On trans-scientific problems as they relate to law, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 158 (2006). For 
discussion of their relevance to corporate law and legal standards of review, see Gold, supra note 23, 
at 452–67. 
 37. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1189, 1201 (2002) (“Whether the social losses from shareholder primacy outweigh the social 
losses from allowing greater director discretion is an extraordinarily complex question. Moreover, 
the answer is likely to vary from firm to firm and from one historical period to another.”). 
 38. As Sunstein notes, the time constraints that affect judges are one of the bases for adopting 
incompletely theorized agreements. See Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1749 (“[I]ncompletely theorized 
agreements may be the best approach available for people with limited time and capacities.”). 
 39. On the relevant distinction between standards of conduct and standards of review, see 
generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
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say about fiduciary duties and the parties to whom they are owed, we see 
a continuation of the above theme of non-decision. We see a clear reluc-
tance to determine precisely whom directors should seek to benefit. 
This non-decision is significant. For although the business judg-
ment rule may be an area where various theories of the firm converge, 
the object of fiduciary duties is not. Different theories of the firm diverge 
sharply as to which parties directors should seek to benefit. Following 
specific theories of the firm, courts might say that fiduciary duties are 
owed to the shareholders. Or they might say that they are owed to the 
corporation. Effectively, courts choose neither of these paths. Instead, 
courts announce that fiduciary duties are owed to both the shareholders 
and the corporation. And because the interests of shareholders and the 
interests of the corporation will sometimes conflict, this amounts to an 
indeterminate standard. 
Moreover, courts are leaving things undecided in an area that mat-
ters. Arguably, the fiduciary beneficiary question  is one of the most fun-
damental questions in corporate law. It is true that director liability will 
only rarely turn on this question. But the presence of the business judg-
ment rule does not make judicial statements regarding fiduciary stand-
ards of conduct irrelevant as a practical matter. Judicial statements re-
garding fiduciary duties are often thought to affect director behavior, 
even if those statements will rarely lead to liability given business judg-
ment rule protections. This is particularly so if, as Douglas Baird and 
Todd Henderson suggest, directors “want to do what they are supposed 
to do.”40 The indeterminacy here thus calls for an explanation. 
A. The Ambiguity of the Case Law 
In the recent Gheewalla decision, the Delaware Supreme Court 
concluded that “[i]t is well-established that the directors owe their fiduci-
ary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”41 Similar state-
ments are found in prior decisions.42 In addition, although the Delaware 
courts will sometimes just refer to duties owed to shareholders or to du-
                                                            
 40. See Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1309, 1323 (2008); see also Stephen A. Smith, The Normativity of Private Law, 31 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 215, 216 (2011) (contending that “citizens sometimes do what legal rules stipulate 
simply because they are legal rules and not because of the incentives that the law offers for compli-
ance”). 
 41. N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) 
(emphasis added). 
 42. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (indicating that directors “stand in 
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders”). 
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ties owed to the corporation, the phrasing alternates with frequency.43 
The result is substantial ambiguity. 
Can we nonetheless understand this legal doctrine from the per-
spective of a particular theory of the firm? The answer may depend on 
how deeply the ambiguity runs. As will be developed, these open-ended 
qualities of fiduciary duties are a characteristic feature of Delaware cor-
porate law. 
Christopher Bruner has provided one of the more sustained recent 
treatments of this ambiguity, and his argument is worth considering in 
detail.44 In Bruner’s view, the courts’ announcement of multiple benefi-
ciaries reflects a broader theme in corporate law—judicial ambivalence 
over core features of corporate law. Ultimately, Bruner sees corporate 
law as ambivalent over the power structures within the corporation, am-
bivalent over the beneficiaries of corporate production, and most funda-
mentally, ambivalent over the relation between corporate law and 
achievement of the social good.45 
Bruner considers these issues against the backdrop of several lead-
ing theories of the firm in the legal literature: the director primacy ap-
proach (which he groups under the “nexus-of-contracts” approach); the 
team production approach; and the shareholder primacy approach. For 
present purposes, Bruner’s claim about corporate law’s beneficiaries is 
the key concern. A brief review of Bruner’s argument follows. 
The director primacy approach suggests that shareholders do not 
actually own the corporation.46 They are residual claimants but not cor-
porate owners. Consistent with this view, shareholders are quite limited 
in their authority with respect to corporate decision-making. They are 
permitted to vote only in certain limited settings, and in those settings 
where they may vote their ability to effect changes is circumscribed. This 
is not to say that shareholders are powerless. One of the main ways in 
which shareholders influence the direction of corporate conduct is 
through their ability to sell their shares. But it is a key feature of corpo-
rate law that the board is granted the primary role in managing corporate 
affairs. 
                                                            
 43. For an indication of the ambiguity in Delaware courts’ statements on this topic, see E. 
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can A Director Serve? A Look At 
The Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 764 n.8 (2008) (listing cases that 
describe duties owed to the corporation or to the corporation and its shareholders).  For discussion of 
the beneficiaries question in the takeover context, see Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and 
the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 923−25 (1990). 
 44. See Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
1385 (2008). 
 45. See id. at 1386, 1421. 
 46. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 563–65 (critiquing the view that shareholders own the 
firm). 
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From this perspective, the board is (and should be) the primary de-
cision-making authority. Indeed, in one articulation, the board is a sui 
generis body, like a set of Platonic guardians.47 In light of the limitations 
on shareholder authority, however, shareholders require something in 
return. Shareholder wealth maximization becomes a central component 
of the director primacy theory.48 Fiduciary duties reflect this emphasis. 
Given the shareholders’ residual claimant status, and the general absence 
of contractual protections for shareholders, they are the beneficiaries of 
the board’s fiduciary duties. 
Bruner contends that this theory runs into difficulty on shareholder 
wealth maximization. He notes that no state statute explicitly creates a 
shareholder wealth maximization norm.49 And legal doctrine often cuts 
the other way. In the takeover setting, boards are empowered as a de fac-
to matter to reach decisions on bases that suggest shareholder wealth 
maximization is only one of several aims that boards may consider.50 The 
business judgment rule, combined with recognition that boards may con-
sider long-term shareholder interests, makes it quite easy for the board to 
ignore shareholder wealth maximization.51 And in various settings, 
boards may support charitable donations.52 Bruner suggests that each of 
these facts runs contrary to a shareholder wealth maximization norm. 
In contrast, a team-production theory suggests that boards should 
take into account a variety of corporate constituencies.53 Here, various 
constituents of the firm function as a team, making team-specific invest-
ments in the corporate enterprise. Like the director primacy view, a team 
production theory of corporate law suggests that the board should have a 
great deal of power. This is because the board should serve as a neutral 
mediating hierarch, deciding among the various claims of these diverse 
constituencies.54 The beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties is differ-
ent, however. Under the team-production view, directors’ fiduciary du-
ties are owed to the firm as a whole.55 
                                                            
 47. See id. at 560. 
 48. See id. at 577–84 (discussing shareholder wealth maximization). 
 49. See Bruner, supra note 44, at 1400 (“The claim that shareholder wealth maximization is the 
corporate end upon which the (hypothetically) negotiating parties would rationally agree is undercut 
by the fact that no state statute explicitly mandates the maximization of shareholder wealth.”). 
 50. See id. at 1415–18 (analyzing from this perspective the decisions in Paramount Commc’ns 
v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). 
 51. See id. at 1401. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Blair & Stout, supra note 8, at 280–81. 
 54. See id. at 276–87. 
 55. See id. at 298. 
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Team production theories have little difficulty with the various 
takeover precedents that allow the board to consider the interests of 
shareholders, creditors, employees, and even the local community.56 Nor 
are they troubled by the degree to which boards can favor other constitu-
encies thanks to a strong business judgment rule. Critics have found a 
different problem for the team-production approach. The very freedom 
that allows boards to choose not to engage in shareholder wealth maxi-
mization also gives the board the ability to actively engage in sharehold-
er wealth maximization.57 And in many cases, boards are dominated by a 
controlling shareholder, undermining the neutral, mediating hierarch 
model.58 In these cases, the image of the board as a mediating hierarch 
breaks down. 
The shareholder primacy approach, as the name suggests, views 
shareholders as the owners of the firm.59 From this perspective, share-
holders should have at least some authority over the firm.60 Proponents 
of this view also tend to support a variety of legal reforms to bring corpo-
rate law more in line with this conception of the shareholder role. Many 
of these proposed reforms focus on increasing the effectiveness of share-
holder voting rights beyond their current level.61 
Whatever its normative merits may be, Bruner indicates that the 
shareholder primacy account is descriptively weak in certain areas. Like 
the director primacy account, it founders on the shareholder wealth max-
imization norm.62 While a shareholder primacy account suggests share-
holder wealth maximization should be a core requirement of corporate 
law, there are various contexts in which boards have de jure or de facto 
discretion to act differently. 
                                                            
 56. The Revlon case may present more of a challenge for team-production theorists, although 
there are answers available. See id. at 309 (providing an account of the Revlon case). 
 57. See Bruner, supra note 44, at 1403; see also David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as 
Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1022 
(2000). 
 58. See Bruner, supra note 44, at 1403; see also John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of 
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999). 
 59. For a description of a shareholder-oriented model as the “standard model” in corporate law, 
see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 
(2001). For recent analysis and defense of the view that shareholders own the corporation, see Julian 
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897. 
 60. See Bruner, supra note 44, at 1405–07 (discussing this type of perspective). 
 61. See id. at 1406 (discussing Lucian Bebchuk’s efforts in this regard). 
 62. See id. at 1407 (“Perhaps more importantly, the shareholder primacist’s claim that the 
purpose of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth encounters the same descriptive prob-
lems that the nexus-of-contracts theory does: the absence of any such general duty, the explicit en-
dorsement of deviations from it, and the relative insulation of tacit deviations from it under the busi-
ness judgment rule.”). 
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In short, the question to whom fiduciary duties are owed is not a 
question we can readily sidestep by looking to the practical effects of 
corporate law doctrine. It is not merely that courts explicitly say director 
fiduciary duties are owed to both shareholders and the corporation. It is 
that, as a practical matter, the law in this area is indeterminate or subject 
to conflicting interpretations. As Bruner’s analysis suggests, the question 
of fiduciary beneficiaries implicates a deep ambiguity in corporate law. 
The law concerning fiduciary beneficiaries is unclear and has been un-
clear for some time. 
B. Director Social Norms and the Significance of Ambiguity 
The above discussion suggests the descriptive challenges faced by 
theories of the firm that also aim to interpret corporate law. It does not 
necessarily mean courts are questioning the relationship between share-
holders’ interests and the interests of society.63 Delaware courts typically 
indicate a strong sense of optimism about the benefits of Delaware cor-
porate law, with respect to both shareholders and society.64 But these 
descriptive challenges are important. In an area where theories of the 
firm often lead to strong opinions about which parties directors should 
seek to benefit, the courts have left the law’s perspective uncertain. 
What are we to make of these circumstances? We might conclude 
that the above descriptive concerns are largely irrelevant, given the busi-
ness judgment rule. Directors will rarely be held to account for their sub-
jective interpretation concerning fiduciary beneficiaries. Accordingly, 
courts would have less need to focus their attention on a precise defini-
tion of fiduciary beneficiaries. 
Doctrinal choices concerning fiduciary beneficiaries are not neces-
sarily irrelevant, however. For one thing, there are exceptions to the 
business judgment rule’s protections. In certain extreme circumstances, 
the business judgment rule may not protect directors who knowingly act 
contrary to the interests of their beneficiaries.65 This means that, at least 
                                                            
 63. Cf. id. at 1449 (suggesting the ambivalence of corporate law regarding beneficiaries re-
flects “larger misgivings about the consistency of shareholders’ interests and incentives with those of 
society at large”). 
 64. A good example is Chancellor Chandler’s recent defense of the business judgment rule in 
the Disney litigation: 
Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken in 
good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take 
decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value. The entire advantage of the risk-taking, 
innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the Delaware corporation would cease to exist, 
with disastrous results for shareholders and society alike. 
In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 65. This follows from the reasoning in the Disney cases and also from the holding in Stone ex 
rel AmSouth Bancorp. v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). Deliberate failures to comply with fiduci-
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occasionally, directors may face liability risk or reputational sanctions 
that hinge on the courts’ definition of a fiduciary beneficiary. For anoth-
er, even if we discount the possibility of external sanctions, directors 
may conclude they should act in certain ways simply because they wish 
to comply with whatever duty the courts describe.66 In other words, they 
may feel obligated to follow the legal rules because they are the legal 
rules. This need not occur with respect to a majority of directors in order 
for it to have a significant impact. If a sizable subset of directors would 
alter their behavior—and perhaps their individual theory of the firm—
based on judicial statements concerning fiduciary duty, this becomes a 
question of legal significance. 
It is also possible that judicial statements regarding the content of 
fiduciary duties (or in this case, the beneficiaries of that content) can 
have an impact on director social norms. Director social norms, in turn, 
may have an impact on how fiduciary duties are internalized by individ-
ual directors.67 Furthermore, even where social norms do not cause direc-
tors to internalize a particular understanding of their fiduciary responsi-
bilities, directors may nonetheless feel substantial pressure to act in ways 
that comply, or appear to comply, with the relevant norms. 
For example, judicial statements regarding fiduciary duties may af-
fect director conduct by signaling a social consensus concerning appro-
priate behavior.68 Delaware judges are likely to have views of corporate 
law that correspond roughly to commonly held perspectives in the busi-
ness world. And to the extent some directors publicly express the views 
stated by these judges, the perception of an established norm may be re-
inforced. In addition, judicial opinions in this area may create a salient 
                                                                                                                                     
ary duties can trigger bad-faith claims under the duty of loyalty. See id. at 370. For discussion of the 
rare circumstances that do fall outside the business judgment rule in this way, see Andrew S. Gold, 
The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 500 n.198 (2009) (not-
ing that the Delaware Supreme Court has “adopted a challenging standard for claims of bad-faith-
based disloyalty in transactional contexts” and that claims for lack of oversight are similarly difficult 
to demonstrate). 
 66. See Smith, supra note 40 (describing how parties may feel an obligation to follow law 
because it is law). 
 67. See Gold, supra note 65, at 515–16; cf. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychol-
ogy & Morality, in MORAL COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING 101–31 (Douglas Medin et al. eds., 
2009) (“Rather than (just) working directly to change behaviors and attitudes, the law is able to work 
via more subtle psychological processes, to shape perceptions of morality—even for those citizens 
who would not take the state of the law alone as authoritative guidance for their moral beliefs.”). 
 68. On the signaling effects of law, see Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Ex-
pressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Regulation, and 
Development of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 388 (1997). For discussion of the relation between 
this signaling and the law of fiduciary duties, see Gold, supra note 65, at 520–21. 
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focal point around which directors can coordinate.69 This too could affect 
director social norms. Indirectly, these effects on social norms may then 
encourage directors to internalize particular conceptions of fiduciary du-
ty. 
Given these possibilities, we may reasonably predict that the courts’ 
selection of fiduciary beneficiaries—whether it is the shareholders as a 
whole, a subgroup of shareholders, or the corporation—will make a dif-
ference for the way directors act. The courts’ choice to leave this core 
area of fiduciary doctrine ambiguous is thus a potentially important phe-
nomenon even with the business judgment rule as a backdrop. For if 
courts were to adopt a particular view on fiduciary beneficiaries, they 
could have real world effects on the governance of corporations. This 
suggests the ambiguity of fiduciary beneficiaries may mean something, 
and we should seek a basis for it in our interpretation of corporate law. 
C. Explanations for the Indeterminacy 
In light of these premises, there are still a variety of ways to inter-
pret (and perhaps also justify) the undecided legal doctrine. Some of 
them could even include particular theories of the firm. The very ambi-
guity that pervades this area makes a conclusive interpretation difficult. 
Several plausible explanations, however, suggest that this ambiguity is a 
product of judicial choices not to adopt a theory of the firm. 
One potential explanation is that corporate law is simply displaying 
a form of prudence. Courts could be following a principle that they 
should do no harm when faced with uncertainty.70 They might avoid de-
fining the beneficiaries of fiduciary obligation unless they are confident 
they know which definition will be desirable. On the other hand, a lack 
of guidance from the courts may itself do harm, and presumably courts 
are aware of this. Directors, shareholders, and corporations might benefit 
from having a more precise answer—even an imperfect one—rather than 
the current level of vagueness in the legal doctrine.71 
It is also possible that the indeterminate legal doctrine serves as a 
means to bring about desired ends. On this view, courts may be adopting 
                                                            
 69. On focal points and the expressive functions of law, see Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1659–60 (2000). For discussion of the focal 
point theory as it relates to the law of fiduciary duties, see Gold, supra note 65, at 518–19. 
 70. We might also imagine a form of prudence motivated by political concerns. Certain fea-
tures of fiduciary doctrine may allow Delaware courts a flexible means to address political pressures. 
See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Juris-
prudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (analyzing the fiduciary duty of good faith in these terms). Argua-
bly, the vagueness here could play a similar role. 
 71. Cf. Gold, supra note 65, at 503–09 (discussing information costs as they relate to a fiduci-
ary standard of conduct). 
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a response to uncertainty that is intended to encourage preferred out-
comes, rather than merely avoid undesirable ones. Faced with intractable 
uncertainty, courts may hope to make the best of the circumstances. In-
determinate doctrine may play an instrumental role, comprising an af-
firmative benefit rather than a prudential measure to limit judicial errors. 
For example, consider Seana Shiffrin’s recent account of legal 
vagueness.72 Shiffrin argues that in certain circumstances, opaque laws 
may induce individuals to beneficially engage in moral deliberation.73 
Her classic illustration involves traffic law. In some contexts, drivers 
may drive with a greater degree of care when faced with a regulation that 
includes a degree of uncertainty than they do when confronted with a 
series of precise rules. In the former case, they may be more inclined to 
give thought to appropriate conduct (thus increasing safety), while in the 
latter case, they are more apt to comply with the law through routine be-
havior.74 
Something analogous could occur when laws direct compliance 
with vague moral concepts. Shiffrin’s suggestion is that in certain set-
tings, vagueness in the law may induce citizens to engage in moral delib-
eration as to the best behavior.75 And for a variety of reasons—grounded 
in both moral and political philosophy—she concludes this deliberation 
can be a desirable outcome. Perhaps her insights also apply here. 
Admittedly, traffic law is very different from corporate law, as any 
commentator or court can attest. And we may feel that moral reasoning 
and questions of loyalty do not perfectly converge.76 Moreover, there is 
empirical uncertainty involved here as well. The benefits that Shiffrin 
proposes are conjectural, and they are potentially swamped by the costs. 
The point, however, is that uncertainty in the law of fiduciary beneficiar-
ies could have salutary effects precisely because of the way uncertainty 
affects legal actors. On this hypothesis, uncertainty may be adopted for 
its positive properties.77 
                                                            
 72. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of 
Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1219–21 (2010). 
 73. See id. at 1220 (“The evident uncertainty prompts drivers to pay greater attention to their 
driving, to think about how to negotiate a road, and to think about how to treat the specific pedestri-
ans and cars around them.”). 
 74. See id. (discussing nuances). 
 75. See id. at 1223 (“Where standards incorporating moral terms regulate conduct, citizens may 
themselves have to deliberate about what is morally proper and should be expected of them.”). The 
potential costs and benefits of this outcome, where it occurs, are discussed at much greater length 
(and with greater sophistication) in Shiffrin’s paper. Here, her argument is used solely for illustrative 
purposes.  
 76. See Gold, supra note 65, at 525 (suggesting loyalty and morality can have distinct content). 
 77. Indeterminacy of fiduciary content may also have benefits, but the concern here is with the 
indeterminacy concerning beneficiaries. For a more general discussion of potential benefits from 
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Moreover, indeterminate law on corporate fiduciary duties may also 
be linked to economic efficiency. For example, in a draft article I suggest 
that the ambiguous law on fiduciary beneficiaries permits directors to 
shift their interpretation of fiduciary law over time, and that it permits 
new boards to interpret the beneficiary question differently from old 
boards.78 The effect is a dynamism in fiduciary duties that allows for var-
iation in corporate governance. This variation potentially allows for de-
sirable innovations. 
The core idea here stems from Armen Alchian’s work on uncertain-
ty and economic theory. As Alchian suggests, we can turn to principles 
of biological evolution to understand the success of firms.79 From this 
perspective, “those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those 
who suffer losses disappear.”80 By an evolutionary process, business 
plans that work—for whatever reason—will tend to win out over time. In 
light of this insight, directors’ selection of fiduciary beneficiaries can be 
seen as a business judgment. Or in some cases, the selection can be seen 
as a matter of luck.81 On the evolutionary account, the important thing is 
that successful innovations may result from the various ways in which 
directors interpret the vague fiduciary standard that courts have provid-
ed.82 
Of course, the reader might not find Shiffrin’s argument applicable 
here, and the reader might not find the evolutionary account convincing 
with respect to this feature of corporate law. In short, the reader might 
not see affirmative benefits to the ambiguity of fiduciary beneficiaries. 
Perhaps courts would feel similarly. But the present concern is not that 
we determine precisely why courts have adopted an indeterminate an-
swer on the fiduciary beneficiaries question. Instead, the concern is in-
terpretive. Does it make sense to think of corporate law as lacking a par-
ticular theory of the firm? 
The above discussion suggests that the ambiguity of fiduciary bene-
ficiaries is not a peripheral feature of corporate law, but rather a central 
question to be explained. The motivations for the legal doctrine may be 
                                                                                                                                     
indeterminacy in corporate law, see Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the 
Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1081–85 (2000). 
 78. See Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming) (on file 
with author). 
 79. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, in 1 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ARMEN ALCHIAN 3 (Daniel K. Benjamin ed., 2005). 
 80. Id. at 6. 
 81. Cf. id. at 8–10 (discussing the potential role for luck in successful business choices). 
 82. Note that this idea may also be tied in with justifications for the business judgment rule, 
particularly if it is conceived of as an incompletely theorized agreement. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 30, 
at 1749 (“[I]ncompletely theorized agreements may be valuable when what is sought is moral evolu-
tion over time.”). 
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several. This indeterminacy may well be a prudential response to judicial 
uncertainty; it may also be something more. But in either event, the am-
biguity here is important—and it is also a salient feature of the law. Un-
der many leading theories of the firm, we would have difficulty predict-
ing this feature. It is an ambiguity we can predict if courts are seeking to 
avoid adopting a particular theory of the firm. 
What we see then is a pattern. We can reasonably interpret the am-
biguity regarding fiduciary beneficiaries as part of a larger indeterminacy 
in corporate law.83 And we can interpret the ambiguity as deliberate. 
From this perspective, it is yet another feature of a corporate jurispru-
dence that has not definitively arrived at a particular theory of the firm. 
In order to non-arbitrarily determine which beneficiaries are owed fidu-
ciary duties, courts would need to announce a more complete theory of 
the firm—and they are not doing so. Instead, courts are avoiding those 
legal determinations that would require them to select a particular theory 
of the firm. 
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE PURPOSE CLAUSES 
Thus far, we have focused on judicial responses to judicial uncer-
tainty, but there are other institutions involved in corporate law. It is 
worth considering legislative responses to judicial uncertainty as well. 
From this perspective, the provisions in the Delaware code that provide 
for freedom in crafting corporate purpose clauses are also significant.84 
Corporate purpose clauses are sometimes used as evidence in favor 
of a particular theory of the firm. For example, Margaret Blair and Lynn 
Stout suggest that, given their interpretation of corporate law as a whole, 
fiduciary duties are effectively owed to the firm, rather than to share-
holders. They suggest that if shareholder wealth maximization were what 
parties wanted when they found a corporation, it would always be possi-
ble to adopt a corporate purpose clause that calls for shareholder wealth 
maximization.85 Yet, firms rarely choose this option. 
                                                            
 83. This possibility is, at this point, still a hypothesis. This Essay does not address each and 
every important feature of corporate law in arriving at an interpretation of fiduciary beneficiary 
doctrine, but rather offers an argument that we should take seriously the idea that corporate law lacks 
a particular theory of the firm. 
 84. We might also consider the discretion to amend corporate charters and bylaws, but in this 
context, the corporate purpose clause seems most directly relevant. Likewise, we might consider the 
freedom to select different business entities as an alternative means for business people to respond to 
an erroneous legal endorsement of a particular theory of the firm. In this respect, the ability to elimi-
nate fiduciary duties altogether for Delaware LLCs may take on added significance. 
 85. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in 
Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 740–42 (2006). 
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Of course, much depends on how one reads the status quo. Corpo-
rate purpose clauses are typically set to give the broadest allowable scope 
for corporate action. For a theorist who sees corporate law as generally 
inclining toward a duty of shareholder wealth maximization, the absence 
of corporate purpose clauses that call for directors to act in the best inter-
ests of the firm could be read as supporting evidence that shareholder 
wealth maximization is what corporate founders have in mind. Likewise, 
if one takes seriously the view that directors owe their fiduciary duties to 
the corporation and its shareholders—which is what courts expressly 
state—then the absence of contrary corporate purpose clauses could be 
read as supporting a satisfaction with the current doctrinal vagueness 
(and, perhaps, the flexibility it permits). Without significantly more em-
pirical work, these perspectives are hard to assess. 
But there is also another possibility. We can think of the corporate 
purpose clause as a further response to judicial uncertainty. For what the 
corporate purpose clause provision in the Delaware code most promi-
nently does is permit variation in corporate purposes—given whatever 
background interpretation courts are providing. The point then is not how 
the provision is currently exercised against a backdrop of existing judi-
cial precedents concerning the theory of the firm, but how it could be 
exercised. The availability of changes to corporate purpose clauses 
amounts to a legislatively provided safety valve. 
In addition, it is worth keeping in mind that even in not giving an 
express answer on the theory of the firm, courts may still be producing 
an undesirable legal doctrine for some firms. Perhaps there are some 
firms that will be better off if directors cannot readily exercise discretion 
in their interpretation of the appropriate beneficiary of their fiduciary 
duties. Or perhaps the absence of guidance from the courts concerning 
their theory of the firm is not as complete as it might be. Courts, in other 
words, may implicitly adopt a particular theory of the firm in some set-
tings, and they may err in doing so. For these circumstances, there is still 
a convenient means to customize one’s firm—the corporate purpose 
clause. 
For the most part, corporate law is comprised of default terms. Cor-
porate purpose clauses receive less attention than the contractual freedom 
to amend corporate charters and bylaws. This may be due to the fact that 
corporate founders generally select the broadest corporate purpose clause 
available, thus rendering alternatives largely academic.86 Yet, the exist-
                                                            
 86. Non-exercise does not equate to unimportance, of course. For example, the Third Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution has been remarkably dormant in practice but may nonetheless 
provide an important bulwark against misused government power. As such examples suggest, the 
importance of having a right can be assessed independently from the frequency of its exercise. 
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ence of the corporate purpose clause as an option can be seen as yet an-
other measure of caution—a prudential device made available to avoid 
the costs associated with potentially undesirable legal conceptions of the 
firm. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Essay does not claim that all of corporate law is premised on 
judicial uncertainty about ideal theories of the firm, nor that all relevant 
features of corporate law are indeterminate. Certain features of corporate 
law may indeed reflect a particular theory of the firm. Other features may 
reflect a different set of values altogether, unrelated to theories of the 
firm. Moreover, the very doctrinal murkiness that makes this Essay’s 
hypothesis plausible also makes it hard to definitely prove the hypothe-
sis. Perhaps in subtle ways, courts are really fans of the team production 
theory, or perhaps deep down they agree with shareholder primacy ac-
counts. When it comes to the theory of the firm, courts are hard to pin 
down. 
We should also keep in mind the possibility of pluralism. Corporate 
law may be explained by a multitude of theories of the firm, with each 
occupying a specific domain. Particular theories of the firm may explain 
particular niches of corporate law. Likewise, several theories of the firm 
may be balanced against each other with compromise results in areas of 
conflict. This Essay examines a core area of corporate law; it by no 
means covers all aspects of the subject matter. 
That said, several of the core features of corporate law can be un-
derstood in terms of an intentionally noncommittal stance. The business 
judgment rule permits courts to avoid deciding on their preferred theory 
of the firm. The vague standard on fiduciary beneficiaries permits courts 
to delegate these questions to boards of directors. And corporate purpose 
clauses enable parties to avoid—to some degree—mistaken judicial theo-
ries of the firm (including theories that have yet to arise). 
No theory of the firm is a perfect fit for corporate law. Instead, legal 
academics typically suggest that their theory is the best fit. If the inde-
terminacy argument is correct, however, then we should consider that a 
particular theory of the firm may not carry the day even if that theory of 
the firm is better than its rivals. For judicial indecision on theories of the 
firm can explain significant features of corporate legal doctrine, and giv-
en the severe empirical uncertainty surrounding theories of the firm, that 
indecision may be a quite reasonable judicial approach. 
 
